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ANGUAGE, as modern philosophers tell us, is the medium of
thought; "understanding itself has a fundamental connection with
language."' Without language, we could not formulate complex
ideas within our own minds, communicate those ideas to others, or pass
them down from one generation to the next. Thus, knowledge would not
cumulate, and cultural continuity would be impossible. But if language is
a source of our humanity and cultural unity, it is also a political battle-
ground. It is regarded as an essential component of ethnic identity, the
characteristic that most distinctively sets one group apart from others.
Two of the world's wealthiest, most democratic nations, Canada and
Belgium, have virtually been torn apart by conflicts over language use.
2
Many developing nations have proven to be largely ungovernable be-
cause of their multiplicity of languages, the refusal of many groups or
tribes to abandon their own language in favor of a national tongue, and
the refusal of the national government to accommodate the languages
that these groups or tribes have retained.3
Extensible Markup Language, or XML, is a language, as its name sug-
gests, as well as a means of creating subsidiary languages.4 It is not the
language of any geographic locality, however; no group of XML speakers
will implore any nation in the world to allow them to secede and create
their own political entity. If XML speakers constitute a tribe, they are a
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. J.D. Yale Law School, 1979.
1. HANS-GEORO GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 357 (1988).
2. See generally LIESBET HOOGHE, A LEAP IN THE DARK: NATIONALIST CONFLICT
AND FEDERAL REFORM IN BELGIUM (1991); EVA MACKEY, THE HOUSE OF DIFFERENCE:
CULTURAL POLITICS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CANADA (1999); PETER NEWMAN, THE
CANADIAN REVOLUTION, 1985-1995: FROM DEFERENCE TO DEFIANCE (1995).
3. See generally BRIAN HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985).
4. See generally Winchel "Todd" Vincent, I1, Legal XML and Standards for the Le-
gal Industry, 53 SMU L. REV. 1395 (2000); see also Bert Bos, XML in 10 Points (last modi-
fied Mar. 9, 2000) <http://www.w3.org/xml/1999/XML-in-10-points>. Strictly speaking,
XML is best described as a meta-language, that is, a set of rules by which languages can be
created. For this reason, it is not a false reification of an acronym to speak of an "XML
language," even though the "L" in "XML" stands for the word "language." Since XML is




tribe of highly-educated computer programmers working for or running
the world's most forward-looking firms. If these speakers are located
anywhere, it is in that disconcertingly abstract realm known as cyber-
space. If XML has a vocabulary, it is not a fixed catalogue of words but a
framework that allows the creation of subsidiary languages, which are
themselves frameworks that allow participants to converse in ordinary
languages.
Despite its technical, disembodied, and abstract character, XML is not
merely a rational, scientific response to a communications problem. It is
a language that represents both the promise and the problems that are
common to the more familiar languages of "meatspace." Like these lan-
guages, XML facilitates thought and allows knowledge to cumulate over
space and time. Like these languages as well, it becomes more effective
and more powerful the more widely it is used. Wittgenstein asserts that a
private language cannot even exist;5 even assuming that it could, it would
not be of much use. Norwegian, with about four million speakers, is
more useful, German, with about 100 million, is more useful still, and
English, which was has at least 350 million native speakers and has be-
come, to the dismay of the French, the lingua franca of the world, is the
most useful of all.6 Thus, language displays the characteristic that econo-
mists describe as a positive network externality. 7 Each additional person
who makes an individual, self-interested decision to join the community
of speakers confers a benefit on the existing speakers. The more people
see fit to join, the more powerful the language becomes as an instrument
for thought and communication.
These advantages, however, result from conscious and unconscious
choices that have disadvantages as well. XML, like every language, pos-
sesses an internal structure that excludes some modes of thought and pos-
sibilities of communication at the same time that it facilitates others. In
creating a community of speakers who can use the language, it necessarily
creates a body of outsiders for whom it is incomprehensible, and a body
of novices for whom it is difficult. To the extent that its speakers control
resources and use the language to manage or allocate those resources it
greatly decreases the ability of outsiders to share those resources, and
often denies them access to those resources entirely. In other words,
5. See LuDwiG WI-IIGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 256-281 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., Oxford 1953). "If a person speaks when no one else is present, does that
mean he is speaking to himself?" Id. § 260. "Why can't my right hand give my left hand
money? ... [Because] the further practical consequences would not be those of a gift ....
And the same could be asked if a person had given himself a private definition of a word
.Id. § 268.
6. See DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE app. III, at
436-44 (1987). When those who use English as a second language are added, the number
of speakers is between .7 and 1.4 billion. On the use of English as a world language, see id.
at 358-59.
7. See STEPHEN SEGALLER, NERDS 2.0.1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET 283
(1998) (Metcalfe's Law, named after Ethernet founder Bob Metcalfe, is: "The power of a
network is N squared, where N is the number of nodes .... The reason [for squaring] is
that the network gets more valuable to me if you come on it.").
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XML, like every language, creates political issues. This means that it is
likely to become a source of conflict, perhaps as great a source as Basque,
or French or Kannada.
This article is a preliminary inquiry into the political implications of
XML. Part I describes the governance structure of one aspect of cyber-
space that will directly affect the acceptance of XML and that demon-
strates where many of the promises and problems for a computer
language will reside. This is the World Wide Web, and the privately-de-
veloped World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) that manages it. Part II
describes a publicly-designed mechanism for achieving agreement among
private parties, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990. From this Act,
and other considerations, this section then outlines some general features
of governance structures that do not depend on the government's use of
coercive force, either explicitly or implicitly. Part III describes the struc-
ture of XML itself, in particular its dual character as a network and a
political structure. Part IV then applies these considerations to the gov-
ernance of organizations that will create XML languages. It argues that
the political character of XML language creation requires that these or-
ganizations be regulated and that the more likely regulator is the govern-
ment, not W3C. But it also argues that this regulation, like the regulation
of the negotiated rulemaking process, should not specify substantive re-
sults, but simply specify the structure of the non-governmental decision
making body that creates the language.
I. THE ORIGIN AND GOVERNANCE OF THE
WORLD WIDE WEB
A. ORIGIN
Prior to the late 1960s, computers were viewed as computational de-
vices, not as means of communication. The origins of the Internet lie in
efforts by the Defense Department to establish communication linkages
among the computers in its Advanced Projects Research Agency
(ARPA), which was set up in the wake of the Sputnik launch. This effort
was spearheaded by Bob Taylor, a Pentagon official, as a means of con-
necting large computers at research facilities, thereby saving expenses on
"big iron." The ARPAnet, as it was called, began functioning on an ex-
perimental basis in 1969 among four computers at Stanford, UCLA, the
University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Utah.8
By the 1970s, it had expanded to connect about one hundred facilities. E-
mail was developed by Ray Tomlinson, who worked for a private contrac-
tor to the ARPAnet, in 1972 as a by-product of this network. It allowed
the scientists at the various research facilities to send messages to each
other at the mailboxes they had already established to receive internal
8. See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government Created
Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 38 (1999); SEGALLER,
supra note 7, at 35-116. The first message sent over this network was the unpoetic but
prophetic words "LOG IN." Id. at 92-93.
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communications. Tomlinson chose the @ symbol for the receiver's ad-
dress because it meant "at" and no one had an "@" in their name. 9 In
1973, Bob Metcalfe, working at Xerox Corporation's Palo Alto Research
Center (PARC), invented the Ethernet, a means of connecting hundreds
of smaller computers to form a network. These local area networks,
which tended to be located at a single private company, were then con-
nected to the ARPAnet. 10
The ARPAnet transferred messages between computers by attaching
each one to a smaller computer, or Interface Message Processor (IMP),
which could then communicate with another computer's IMP. This
worked well as long as the computers used the same hardware and
software. ARPAnet's original four computers were designed to be com-
patible, but proliferation of local area networks using Ethernet connec-
tions led to serious incompatibility problems, and thus to greatly reduced
effectiveness of the expanded ARPAnet. Bob Kahn at ARPA and Vint
Cerf at Stanford solved this problem in 1973 by replacing the IMP's with
a protocol, soon divided into two protocols, that allowed different com-
puter networks with different hardware and software to communicate
with each other. 1 The first protocol enclosed each packet of information
generated by a local area network in an Internet Protocol or IP that could
be read by any other local area network connected to the ARPAnet.
The IP did not operate within any of the component networks; rather, it
enclosed the message as it left one network and was opened when it
reached its destination network. To manage the flow of these IP-enclosed
messages as they moved among networks, Kahn and Cerf designed a sec-
ond protocol, the Transmission Control Protocol, or TCP. The combined
TCP/IP resulted in an "inter-networking of networks," which was short-
ened to the term Internet. ARPAnet began using TCP/IP in 1983.
As the Department of Defense's network became more widely known
in government and the scientific community, other agencies began devel-
oping equivalent networks. The most important one was developed by
the National Science Foundation (NSF), and named-logically enough-
NSFnet. It connected both universities and private scientific firms and
because it was designed later, it had much more advanced technology
than ARPAnet.12 The military uses of ARPAnet were transferred to a
separate network, called MILNET, in 1983; by 1989, the NSFnet had ab-
sorbed the remaining ARPAnet activity, and the latter's protocols were
retired.13
The rapid expansion of local area networks connected to the
ARPAnet, and then to NSFnet was paralleled by the rapid development
of personal computers. Ed Roberts, an Air Force engineer, had invented
9. See SEGALLER, supra note 7, at 104-06.
10. See id. at 161-66.
11. See id at 109-13.
12. See id. at 223-25.
13. See id. at 225.
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the first very small computer for personal use in 1975.14 Paul Allen and
Bill Gates, recognizing that a microcomputer would need its own
software, founded Microsoft shortly thereafter.15 By the end of the
1980s, personal computers were in use in a significant proportion of
America's workplaces for word processing, graphics work, and informa-
tion retrieval from stored files, as well as for communication over local
area networks.
These developments created the underlying conditions for the World
Wide Web (the "Web"). The Web itself is a set of protocols developed by
Tim Berners-Lee, an English physicist who was working at CERN, the
European nuclear physics laboratory in Switzerland. 16 Berners-Lee was
looking for a further solution to the incompatibility problem. It was all
very well for TCP/IP to allow messages to be sent between networks, but
Berners-Lee wanted to connect individual documents that were stored in
computers, so that scientists could access each other's work without send-
ing a message and receiving a specific response. To do so, he developed
the idea of hypertext, where texts in different computers were linked to-
gether, so that a person reading one text could immediately access the
other on the basis of a highlighted phrase in the first. The linkage was
provided by a HyperText Transfer Protocol, or HTTP, which establishes a
uniform method of transmitting texts and graphics over TCP/IP, so that
they appear identical. Thus, one computer can reach inside another com-
puter's network and access specific documents, as long as the other com-
puter has an address that the requesting computer can access. 17 These
addresses are provided by the Universal Resource Locator, or URL. The
documents, once transmitted, are displayed on the requesting computer
in a format called HyperText Markup Language, or HTML.18
CERN published these codes on the Internet in 1991, thus making
them available to all participants without charge. In effect, this initiated
the World Wide Web, at least from a technical standpoint. But there was
a major legal impediment to the development of the World Wide Web as
it exists today. The Internet, having been invented by the Defense De-
partment and developed by the National Science Foundation, remained
dedicated to research and education functions. In 1992, at the initiative
of Virginia Representative Rick Boucher, the National Science Founda-
tion Act was amended to remove these restrictions, thereby allowing
commercial uses of the Internet.' 9
14. See id. at 140-42.
15. See id. at 145-50; see also BICKERSTAFF, supra note 8, at 29-31.
16. See SEGALLER, supra note 7, at 283-92; TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB
25-51 (1999).
17. See BERNERS-LEE, supra note 16, at 35-51. The original name of Berners-Lee's
program, when he developed it at CERN in 1980, was "Enquire Within Upon Everything."
Id. at 1-3, 15-16; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 102-04 (1999).
18. For a description of HTML, see Vincent, supra note 4, at 1399-1401.
19. See Pub. L. No. 102-476, § 4, 106 Stat. 2300 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1862).
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During the very first years of the Web's operation texts could only be
accessed by typing in the URL line. A number of groups began working
to develop a browser that would search the Web on the basis of less spe-
cific, more user-friendly instructions. In 1992, a group of computer pro-
grammers at the University of Illinois, led by Marc Andreesen, developed
a program called Mosaic that would apply all the graphical user interfaces
that had been developed for word processing to texts being sent through
the Internet.20 The University was averse to entrepreneurial efforts by its
employees so Andreesen, alert to the commercial possibilities of his pro-
gram, formed a private firm with financier Jim Clark. They named the
company Netscape and two years later released their browser, now called
Netscape Navigator, for free, so that anyone who wanted to use it could
simply download it from the Internet.21 When Microsoft announced that
it was developing a competing browser, the Web suddenly became big
news. It became even bigger news when Netscape, anxious for a cash
infusion to combat Microsoft's challenge, made an initial public offering
whose value rose to 4.4 billion dollars after a single day of trading-the
largest such offering that had ever occurred. 22
B. GOVERNANCE
Even before Andreesen formed Netscape, there was considerable ten-
sion between him and Berners-Lee. Berners-Lee, who was deeply com-
mitted to the Web's universality, feared that Mosaic, and later Netscape,
would try to take over the Web, and rename it after their browser. 23 In
response, Berners-Lee decided to organize a consortium of organizations
that would set standards and develop protocols for the Web. The plan
was based on the earlier X Consortium, which MIT had organized to set
standards for a Unix program.24 In 1994, after Berners-Lee had moved
from CERN to MIT, the World Wide Web Consortium, or W3C, began to
operate. MIT and CERN served as host institutions; within a few years,
however, CERN was replaced by INRIA, a French government computer
facility, and Keio University was added, reflecting the Web's growth in
Asia.25
W3C's small staff is housed at these three institutions. Its first Chair
was Al Vezza of MIT, and its current chair is Jean-Francois Abramatic of
INRI; its Director is Tim Berners Lee.26 This staff is supported by the
20. See SEGALLER, supra note 7, at 296-306.
21. See BERNERS-LEE, supra note 16, at 68-71; SEGALLER, supra note 7, at 301.
22. See BERNERS-LEE, supra note 16, at 92-93, 103-06; SEGALLER, supra note 7, at 302.
23. For a description of the interactions between the Illinois/Netscape group and
Berners-Lee, see BERNERS-LEE, supra note 16, at 68-71. "All my earlier meetings with
browser developers had been meetings of minds, with a pooling of enthusiasm. But this
meeting [with the Illinois group] had a strange tension to it." Id. at 70. Web group refuses
to reschedule its conference when Illinois group's plans conflict because "[tjhere was honor
and pride at stake here, but also the future direction of the Web." Id. at 71.
24. See id. at 75-78.
25. See id. at 101-02, 115-16.
26. See id. at 95, 109.
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members of the Consortium, which pay an annual fee of $50,000 or
$5,000. For-profit firms with an annual gross revenue of over 50 million
dollars pay the higher fee, while smaller firms, non-profits, and govern-
ment organizations pay the lower amount.27 Each member designates
one representative; together these representatives constitute the Advi-
sory Committee.2 8 The Committee meets twice a year in meatspace and,
of course, communicates more frequently over the Internet. The Com-
mittee reviews proposals submitted by the Director and reports its con-
clusions to him. The Director (Berners-Lee) decides whether to
implement the proposal. 29 Smaller groups are selected from among the
members of the Advisory Committee: an Advisory Board, which provides
ongoing advice to the Director, and various Activity Groups that review
specific proposals that the Director submits.30 These groups may also in-
clude invited experts, individuals who do not belong to a member organi-
zation. Of the Activity Groups organized from among the members of
the Advisory Committee, the most important seem to be the Working
Groups, which develop specifications or prototype software. The Direc-
tor appoints the Chair of each Working Group and Advisory Committee
members then decide whether to send a representative. The Chair may
not reject a nomination, but the Director may do So. 3 1
The decision rule for both the Advisory Committee and the Working
Groups is identified as consensus, but it is defined somewhat differently
in each case. For the Advisory Committee, consensus is essentially de-
fined as ninety-five percent agreement. Some proposals are submitted to
a review process, in which comments are solicited from the members of
the Committee. If five percent of the Members are opposed, the review
process begins again, presumably with a different proposal. 32 Other pro-
posals are not submitted for review, but if five percent of the Advisory
Committee appeals the decision, then review must be provided. 33 The
ultimate decision rests with the Director, but the published rules state
that "[a] Director's decision implies that consensus has been reached by
the Advisory Committee ... and accounts for comments collected during
a review, projections as to whether W3C is likely to achieve market con-
sensus, and personal experience. '34
In Working Groups, the Chair decides whether consensus has been
reached "by considering the ideas and viewpoints of all participants (in-
cluding invited experts) who are in good standing. '35 Minority views
27. See id. at 93-94; World Wide Web Consortium Process Document (visited Mar. 14,
2000) <www.w3.org/Consortium/Prospectus/Join> [hereinafter Process Document].
28. See BERNERS-LEE, supra note 16, at 91-102; Process Document, supra note 27, at
§ 2.1.1.
29. See Process Document, supra note 27, at § 2.2.1.
30. See id. at §§ 3.1.1.-3.3.4.
31. See id. at § 3.2.6.
32. See id. at § 2.4.4.
33. See id. at § 2.2.1.
34. Id.
35. Id. at § 3.3.2 (link indicator omitted).
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should be considered, and solutions that everyone finds acceptable are
preferable to ones that a majority finds optimal but a majority finds unac-
ceptable. If the minority will not agree, the "Chair may occasionally ask
members of the minority questions of the general form, 'Can you live
with this decision?" 36 Even if they answer in the negative, however, the
Chair may record dissenting views and proceed. Arbitrary issues that do
not have a "technical or process impact," such as where to meet, may be
resolved by majority vote. 37 The Working Groups are to reach the point
of consensus by holding both face-to-face and remote meetings. To re-
main a member in good standing of the Group, the representative or in-
vited expert must attend both types of meetings on a regular basis.
However, "the Chair may relax the attendance requirement for expensive
meetings (international phone calls or travel) for invited experts who do
not have financial support. '38
At present, the Advisory Committee has 407 members.39 Not surpris-
ingly, the bulk of these, some 273, are computer firms, for-profit compa-
nies whose primary business is the production of computer hardware or
software. Many produce software products specifically for the Internet.
Another sixteen are trade organizations of these same types of compa-
nies. Of the remainder, the main categories consist of twenty-five gov-
ernment research institutes, such as NASA/Ames, Fermilab and CERN;
sixteen government agencies, such as the Library of Congress, London's
Metropolitan Police, Britain's National Health Service, NATO and the
National Security Agency; twenty-five industrial firms such as Boeing,
Eastman Kodak, and Toyota, whose primary lines of business are in non-
computer products; fourteen communications companies, both public and
private; and ten financial firms, such as Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Ameri-
can Express, and TIAA-CREF.40 Finally, there are a few philanthropic
organizations, a few trade organizations for non-computer firms, and the
Hong Kong Jockey Club. 41
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at § 3.3.1.
39. For the list of members, see World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Members Process
Document (visited on Mar. 10, 2000) <http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List>.
40. Other categorizations are possible of course; even accepting those used here, the
particular categorizations can be questioned. Non-computer firms, for example, include
firms whose leading products are mobile phones, such as Ericsson, and financial firms in-
clude internet-oriented institutions such as PrivacyBank.
41. The following is an approximate breakdown by percentage:
Computer-oriented firms 68%
Government research institutes 6%
Non-computer firms 6%





Other trade orgs 1%
Philathropic orgs and jockey clubs 1%
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The evolution and existing procedures of the World Wide Web Consor-
tium are relevant to XML for two different reasons. First, and most obvi-
ously, it is through this procedural structure that the Consortium will
promulgate the standards and protocols for XML.42 Second, the Consor-
tium's procedures are one obvious model to be used by groups develop-
ing more specific languages within the XML framework. XML is more
general than HTML; its power is that it allows more specific languages,
serving the needs of particular industries, disciplines or organizations, to
be established. But such languages must generally be agreed upon; to
modify Wittgenstein's dictum, a private XML language cannot exist.
Agreement requires a procedure among the entities that will use the lan-
guage, whether that procedure is unanimity, consensus, majority voting,
or command through a hierarchy. There are two alternatives to agree-
ment in this situation. The first is market power, where a single entity
creates a language and other entities accept that language because it is in
their economic self-interest to do so. Such efforts, however, are likely to
engender competing efforts by competitors, which may include the for-
mation of an organization to oppose market compulsion. In addition, an-
titrust law is likely to be invoked against such efforts, as it was with
Microsoft,43 because only a monopolist or near monopolist has the level
of market power that would be required. The second alternative to
agreement is governmental action, where a single entity, either part of the
government or designated by it, issues an order backed by some sort of
formal or informal sanctions that rely on governmental force. At present,
no one wants this; the government does not want to under take the task,
private groups do not want government intrusion, and no one thinks the
government will develop the optimal standards.
Cast back upon the mechanism of agreement, the question now is how
to achieve such agreement. As stated, the W3C procedure constitutes
one appealing and readily available approach. It can be described as
achieving the virtues of voluntary participation and consensus decision
making. The question is whether there are alternative approaches, and if
so, which of the approaches is the most desirable.
II. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AS AN ALTERNATIVE
It would be possible to develop a general model of decision making
approaches. Looking only to considerations of participation and deci-
sion-making, one could establish a range of choices along the participa-
tion axis including universal participation, voluntary participation,
restricted participation and so forth. On the decision-making axis, the
42. For descriptions of the W3C efforts to create XML, see Extensible Markup Lan-
guage (XML) (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.w3.org/XML/#9802xml10>; Namespaces
in XML (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.w3.org.TR/1999/REC-xml-names-19990114/>;
Extensible Markup Language (XML) Activity (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.w3.org/
Activity.html>.
43. See generally United States v. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000).
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choices would include unanimity, consensus, supermajority and major-
ity.4 4 Taken together, these two considerations would generate a grid or
set of boxes. American states, for example, use universal participation
and majority rule to select their governor. Many of these boxes, however,
would be empty, or at least uninteresting. Universal participation and
unanimity would lead to deadlock, while restricted participation and ma-
jority vote would produce a decision few non-participating parties would
be likely to accept. In addition, the model operates on such a general,
abstract level that specific mechanisms within each category are
suppressed.
A preferable approach is to look at actual decision-making processes,
such as the W3C procedures, that exist in different settings. Their exis-
tence guarantees their applicability, at least within their own context, and
also provides specific details at the operational level. Following this ap-
proach, then, the W3C procedures will be compared to a different, but
related model that might serve as an alternative. That model is negoti-
ated rulemaking, developed by various federal administrative agencies,
most particularly the Environmental Protection Agency,45 during the
1980s and codified in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.46 Negoti-
ated rulemaking is a mechanism for consensus decision making that re-
sembles the W3C in certain ways and differs from it in others. It is
controversial, and probably has more detractors than supporters at the
present time.47 The point of presenting it here is not to argue its merits in
its present setting but to discuss it as an alternative model of collective
decision making for the new setting of XML creation.
A. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Rulemaking by federal administrative agencies is subject to procedures
codified under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946.48 In
essence, the agency is required to publish the text of a proposed rule in
44. For a general discussion of voting schemes and preference assessment, see KEN-
NETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); RALPH KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA, DECI-
SIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTrIVES: PREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS (1993).
45. See generally Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Perform-
ance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); William Funk, When Smoke
Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Stan-
dards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987); Philip Harter, Point on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution
Procedures and the Administrative Process, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 141 (1987); James Rossi, Partici-
pation Run Amok, The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmak-
ing, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997). For continuing efforts by the EPA to develop
innovative approaches to rulemaking, see Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
46. Codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570. Like other recent statutes, such as the Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b, it is codified as part of the Administrative Procedure Act.
47. For criticisms of negotiated rulemaking, see Coglianese, supra note 45; Funk, supra
note 45; Rossi, supra note 45.
48. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV).
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the Federal Register, and establish a defined period of time when written
comments may be submitted to the agency. The agency may then issue
final rules "with a concise general statement of their basis and purpose."
In doing so, "consideration" of the comments is required, but the agency
has no other definitive obligation.49 It is apparent that this statute grants
citizens rather limited participatory rights in the regulatory process. In
interpreting the APA, courts have often experienced a sense of dissatis-
faction with these limited rights and have struggled to expand them
through creative interpretation. 50 This has been one of the most contro-
versial issues in all of administrative law.
Negotiated rulemaking developed as a means of providing additional
avenues of participation in the regulatory process. It does not replace the
APA's notice and comment procedure; rather, it is an alternative way to
generate the agency proposal that will then be subject to that procedure.
The agency can initiate negotiated rulemaking on its own, or it can ap-
point a convener. The convener's role is to identify persons "who will be
significantly affected by a proposed rule,"'51 and then conduct discussions
with them to determine whether they could effectively participate in a
negotiated rulemaking.52 Once the agency has determined, either on its
own or on the basis of the convener's report, that negotiated rulemaking
is feasible, it must announce this determination in the Federal Register,
and include "a list of the interests which are likely to be significantly af-
fected by the rule," and "a list of the persons proposed to represent such
interests. '53 "Persons who will be significantly affected by a proposed
rule and who believe that their interests will not be adequately repre-
sented by any person specified in the notice ... may apply for, or nomi-
nate another person for membership ... .
If the agency decides to proceed with negotiated rulemaking, it forms a
committee, usually of no more than twenty-five persons.5 5 The commit-
tee's goal is to reach a consensus on a proposed rule, with consensus de-
fined as "unanimous concurrence among the interests represented on a
negotiated rulemaking committee ... unless such committee (A) agrees
to define such term to mean a general but not unanimous concurrence; or
(B) agrees upon another specified definition. '56 If such consensus is
reached, the committee submits the proposed rule to the agency; if it is
not reached, the committee may submit "a report specifying any areas in
which the committee reached a consensus. '57
49. Id. § 553.
50. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See generally Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the
Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV).
52. Id. § 563(b).
53. Id. § 564(a)(3), (4).
54. Id. § 564(b).
55. See id. § 565.
56. Id. § 562(2).
57. Id. § 566(f).
1457
SMU LAW REVIEW
B. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AND W3C COMPARED
The procedure specified in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act bears a cer-
tain resemblance to the procedures of the W3C, but also exhibits some
important differences. To begin with, both use consensus as their deci-
sion procedure, rather than the more familiar procedure of majority, or
even supermajority, voting. All such procedures-that is, consensus, ma-
jority and supermajority-may be regarded as pluralist procedures, in the
sense that they accept the participants' choice of a decision, rather than
relying on some expert or authority or substantive set of rules.5 8 By defi-
nition, there can be only one majority, only one supermajority, and only
one consensus on a given issue. Thus, an unambiguous decision can be
reached without invoking any other criterion aside from the vote. A ma-
jority is the lowest level of agreement that can be characterized as plural-
ist; once a minority is permitted to decide, some expert or authority or
substantive set of rules must be invoked to determine which minority will
prevail.
Within the category of pluralist decisions, majority voting is the most
common, and is typically found where two circumstances prevail: first,
where a definitive decision is necessary, and second, where that decision
can be enforced by some fairly convincing sanction. Consensus is a proce-
dure most often found in the absence of these circumstances. Because
consensus is so difficult to achieve, breakdowns are likely to occur, and
the process will often fail to yield a decision. If the decision cannot be
effectively enforced, however, then consensus may be the only viable op-
tion-that is, the only way to reach a decision that will actually be fol-
lowed since it does not depend on the minority's willingness to accede to
the majority, but only on each participant's willingness to be bound by its
own commitments. Because most or all of the participants agreed at the
moment of decision, all that is required is that they regard their agree-
ment as binding. Social contract theories are based on this feature of
consensus.
The W3C and Negotiated Rulemaking procedures represent different
versions of consensus procedure. W3C defines consensus as either
ninety-five percent, or minority deference; the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act defines it as unanimity. What may explain the difference is that the
W3C is more strongly motivated to rely on consensus because of the sec-
ond circumstance, the lack of an effective sanction. Without any ability
to sanction those who disobey, the Committee must rely on willing com-
pliance. Thus, it needs broad agreement but can tolerate a few dissenters.
Negotiated rulemaking's reliance on consensus is more heavily motivated
58. For general discussions of the increasing role of pluralism in modern administra-
tive law, see THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979); Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277 (1984); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American
Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385; Richard Stew-
art, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
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by the lack of need for a decision. If the negotiation fails to produce a
result, the agency can proceed to draft the rule itself, in exactly the same
manner as it would have done had it followed the more usual approach
and never considered a negotiated rule. The second circumstance does
play a role, however, because one of the main motivations for negotiated
rulemaking is to increase levels of compliance with federal rules. But the
agency can indulge in a unanimity rule because the negotiation need not
produce a result. In fact, a cynical view would suggest that the federal
government chose the unanimity rule because it ensures that relatively
few agency rulemaking efforts will be displaced by negotiated rules.
A second issue where the W3C rules and Negotiated Rulemaking bear
a partial resemblance involves the issue of participation. This is a central
issue for pluralist decision making; since the decision results from some
sort of vote, rather than an authority or an objective standard, the actual
persons who are voting become a matter of obvious concern. The West-
ern legal tradition, until quite recently, was dominated by natural law,
which was defined as a universal set of principles, prescribed by God or
nature, and accessible to reason. 59 This means, at least in theory, that the
identity of the decision maker is not crucial, because any person, other
than a mentally or morally disabled one, will reach the correct conclu-
sion.60 A continuing reverberation of this belief can be found in the the-
ory of constitutional review, which holds that the Constitution embodies
objective standards that will yield the same conclusion regardless of the
identities of the particular judges who are making the decision. The skep-
ticism with which this theory is currently regarded indicates how rapidly
we have progressed toward the pluralist perspective. Administrative law
was an area where objective standards, generally described as expertise,
were regarded as residing, but that belief has rapidly eroded during the
past few decades. Negotiated rulemaking is a dramatic illustration of this
process, of course. The result, both there and in W3C, is the central em-
phasis on the identity of the participants.
W3C is explicitly an organization of organizations, as stated above.
Participation in negotiated rulemaking under the APA is not limited to
organizations, but organizations are the principal participants, for obvi-
ous reasons. Beyond this basic question of identity, both W3C and
rulemaking under the APA are open processes, in the sense that there is
no pre-defined group from which participants are drawn. To become a
59. See generally THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 995-1024 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1981); HUGO GROTIuS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND
PEACE (Walter Dunne trans., 1901). For contemporary statements, see JOHN FINNIS, NAT-
URAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND
NATURAL LAW (Doris Anson trans., 1971); LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE
(1987).
60. The extreme version of this position was articulated by William of Ockham, the
great nominalist philosopher, who argued that any Christian, even a woman or a child,
could oppose a sinful king or pope on the basis of natural law. See WILLIAM OF OCKHAM,




member of the W3C Advisory Committee, an organization need only pay
an annual fee; because this is set at $50,000 in the case of a for-profit firm
with annual sales over $50 million, and $5,000 for all other organizations,
is does not seem like much of an impediment. APA rulemaking does not
have any such requirements for participation. To say anything persua-
sive, however, the commentator will generally need to conduct some re-
search and spend some time crafting the comment, so some expenditure
of financial resources is likely to be involved.
In both federal agency procedure under the APA and the W3C process,
the openness of participation is combined with the participants' relative
lack of authority. An agency is not required to pay any particular atten-
tion to the comments it receives; it is free, in theory and often in practice,
to promulgate a final rule that entirely ignores the commentators' points
of view. The APA does not even require the agency to respond to the
comments in its statement of basis and purpose; it simply requires that
the agency provide such a statement "after consideration of the relevant
matter presented. ' 61 Federal courts that review challenges to agency
rules have been clearly dissatisfied with the spareness of this requirement
and have generally held that agency rules are "arbitrary and capri-
cious," 62 when the agency fails to give serious consideration to relevant
comments. 63 But the Supreme Court has curtailed the creativity of the
Circuit Courts and restricted the APA requirements to a fairly narrow
interpretation of the text.64
As for the W3C, final authority to accept or reject proposals rests with
the Director (Berners-Lee). The rules state, however, that the "director's
decision implies that consensus has been reached by the Advisory Com-
mittee or the Team and accounts for comments collected during the re-
view. ''65 The concept of accounting for comments is reminiscent of the
APA, and equally vague, but the requirement that consensus be achieved
gives the participants a larger role. Nonetheless, final authority rests with
the Director. Both the W3C and the APA procedure may be contrasted
with voting in American elections. These elections are not open; one can-
not simply choose to vote, but must be a citizen, of legal age, and a mem-
ber of the relevant jurisdiction66
61. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
62. Id. § 706(2)(A) (stating the statutory standard for invalidating a rule adopted by
informal rulemaking).
63. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 35 (1983); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-402 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
64. See generally Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distrib.
Co., 498 U.S. 211 (1991); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp. 496 U.S. 633 (1990);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
65. Process Document, supra note 27, § 2.2.1
66. A resident of New Jersey, for example, cannot choose to vote in an election for the
governor of Pennsylvania.
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A somewhat higher level of participation is provided by the negotiated
rulemaking and W3C Working Groups. In a negotiated rulemaking, the
participants are chosen by the convener, according to prescribed criteria,
which is certainly not an open process. In the W3C, the Working Group
consists of Advisory Committee members; any organization may join the
Committee, but those that have actually joined represent a limited group
at a given point in time. Outside experts may also participate in a Work-
ing Group, but they must be specifically selected by the Chair. Once
formed, these two groups exercise a fair amount of authority because
they are actually generating a proposal. There is no guarantee that the
proposal coming out of either group will be adopted, of course, but there
is a virtual guarantee that as long as the group is meeting, no alternative
proposal on the same subject matter will be considered. This represents
what Steven Lukes describes as agenda control.67
III. THE NATURE OF XML
As stated at the outset, any language is both a means of communication
that displays the positive externalities of a network and a set of political
choices that produces different effects upon existing interests. In order to
evaluate the two models of consensus decision-making represented by the
W3C and negotiated rulemaking, it is necessary to consider these two
features in somewhat greater detail. The discussion of this complex topic
presented here will be a cursory one; its purpose is simply to introduce
some of the basic considerations that facilitate the selection and adapta-
tion of a decision-making model.
A. XML AS A NETWORK
The Internet and the World Wide Web are not randomly named; they
display many of the features that have been identified as characterizing
networks. The economic features of networks have been applied to the
Internet by Mark Lemley and David McGowan. 68 Other aspects of a net-
work are described, in somewhat more fanciful terms, by Deleuze and
Guattari's famous description of a rhizome in A Thousand Plateaus.69 A
rhizome is a diffuse underground root system from which above-ground
plants, such as mushrooms and strawberries, emerge. The features that
Deleuze and Guattari derive from this metaphor include an intercon-
nected structure, undifferentiated substructures, functional membership
67. See generally STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
68. See generally Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
69. GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATrARI, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND
SCHIZOPHRENIA 3-25 (1987). Deleuze and Guattari do not explicitly connect their rhizome
image to language; in fact, what they suggest is that some approaches to linguistics (theirs,
for example) are rhizome-like, while others (Chomsky's, for example) are more hierarchi-
cal. See id. at 7-8. Thus, their concept is being applied to language by analogy. This seems
fair enough, since the entire book consists of metaphors that are consciously being used in
a playful manner. See id. at 22-23.
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and open boundaries. These can be understood by contrasting a network
with a hierarchy.70
In a hierarchy, the essential connections are vertical and centralized;
they are formed between higher and lower status components of the hier-
archy, with the components becoming less numerous, and the communi-
cations correspondingly more centralized, at each higher level.71 Thus, an
executive supervises a group of managers, each of whom then supervises
a group of workers; the workers are connected, for official purposes at
least, to the manager, rather than to each other or to the executive. In a
network, connections are horizontal and decentralized, that is, between
each component and many other components, without any status-based
distinctions.72
Second, hierarchies are often differentiated, with each subsection per-
forming a unique task, whereas networks tend to be undifferentiated,
with each subsection reproducing the tasks and patterns of the network as
a whole. 73 It is possible that this feature, at least as stated in the text,
does not truly correspond with Deleuze and Guattari's description. On
the one hand, they do state that a rhizome involves "capture of a code,
surplus value of a code," 74 which sounds a good deal like a network and,
in fact, like Lessig's description of the Internet. 75 On the other hand,
they insist that one section of the rhizome does not reproduce another.
In the same discussion, for example, they state: "There is neither imita-
tion nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on
the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be
attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying."'76 What they may be
referring to here, however, is the lack of coordination (i.e., lines of flight),
rather than the absence of a means of interconnectivity. Thus, the com-
ponents of a network are each able to act in any manner they choose, but
they must reproduce the basic pattern of the network if they are to re-
main part of it. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that once one be-
comes part of a rhizome it is difficult to divest oneself of its operative
pattern, perhaps because of the capacities that the pattern provides.77
"[T]he line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to
70. Deleuze and Guattari's symbol for a hierarchy is a tree. See id. at 5-6. Networks
are one of the dominant images in modern thought, and references to them are far too
numerous to catalogue. For a few examples, see PATRICIA CHURCHLAND & TERRENCE
SEJNOWSKI, THE COMPUTATIONAL BRAIN (1992) (neural network model of human mind);
KARL DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT (1963) (network model of government
and political system); C. NELSON DORNY, UNDERSTANDING DYNAMIC SYSTEMS (1993)
(network model of mechanical and electrical systems).
71. See DELEUZE & GUATrARI, supra note 69, at 7-8.
72. Deleuze and Guattari describe this as the principles of connection and heterogene-
ity. See id.
73. Deleuze and Guattari describe this as the principle of multiplicity, or as one aspect
of that principle. See id. at 8-9. This is closely connected with their next principle, asignify-
ing rupture. See id. at 9-12.
74. Id. at 10.
75. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 102-04.
76. DELEUZE AND GUATrARI, supra note 69, at 10.
77. See id. at 9.
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one another ... You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there
is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify eve-
rything. .... -78 The example that they use to illustrate this feature is the
symbiotic relationship of two organisms, such as a wasp and an orchid.
The reason is that a hierarchy can take advantage of the coordination that
its vertical connections provide, whereas the components of a network
can only rely on the lower level of coordination that can be maintained
through horizontal connections. On the other hand, networks are more
resilient, because they cannot be decapitated, and because damage to one
section leaves other sections performing the same tasks intact;79 this char-
acteristic of networks is sometimes described as graceful degradation. s0
A third contrast is that a hierarchy is structured on the basis of form,
that is, the relative position of its elements; it admits particular individu-
als or components into its structure on the basis of their identity, and then
attempts to determine their behavior in accordance with its goals or pur-
poses. Networks are structured on the basis of function or their opera-
tional program, so that any person or entity who is performing the same
function or following the same operational program can become part of
the network.81 The fourth feature is a direct consequence of the third. A
hierarchy is generally a closed system with a definitive boundary and de-
terminations about additions to the hierarchy are made by some specially
identified component of the hierarchy. A network is an open system in
the same sense that the notice and comment process or the W3C is open;
it has a fluid boundary and new components may join the network at
their own initiative. An alternative image, more specific to a network is
that the network has the ability to expand by engulfing new components
or attaching them to its margins.82 The reason, of course, is that member-
ship on the basis of identity requires a determination whether the particu-
lar individual or entity is one of the ones that the hierarchy will accept,
78. Id.
79. Deleuze and Guattari describe this as the "principle of asignifying rupture." Id. at
9-12 ("A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one
of its old lines, or on new lines.").
80. See WILLIAM BECHTEL & ADELE ABRAHAMSEN, CONNECTIONISM AND THE MIND:
AN INTRODUCTION TO PARALLEL PROCESSING IN NETWORKS 60-62 (1991).
81. The principle of cartography is another aspect of the principle of multiplicity, ac-
cording to Deleuze and Guattari. See DELEUZE & GUA-rrARI, supra note 69, at 8-9, 12-14.
The reason for describing this concept as cartography may not seem obvious (it is not
intended to be); in essence, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between a tracing and a map.
To make a tracing involves passive reproduction of a form, while making a map involves
active construction of that form.
82. This is implication of the principles of multiplicity and cartography. Id. at 8-13; see
also id. at 26-38 ("One or Several Wolves"). "The map is open and connectable in all of its
dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be
torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group or so-
cial formation." Id. at 12. The concepts of open and closed are partially informed by gen-
eral systems theory. See LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATIONS 139-54 (rev. ed. 1968). Deleuze and Guat-
tari seem influenced by this theory at various points, perhaps through Luhmann. See gen-
erally NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bednarz trans., 1994), but they would be
disinclined to acknowledge Luhmann or this approach.
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while membership based on function requires only that the individual or
entity engage in that function and then enter into communication with
the network.
As an illustration, this article is organized hierarchically. It is meant to
be read in a fixed sequence, from page 1447 to page 1475 in this journal,
and it is organized with major and subsidiary headings. This is done in
deference to the traditions of law review publication, and also because of
the nature of the medium, printed words on pages, in which it is
presented. If it were organized in network form, the article might consist
of a collection of segments, each a few paragraphs long, that were inter-
connected with each other, although not meant to be read in any particu-
lar order. Each segment would contain references to some or all of the
others, and none would be identified as principal or subordinate. Such a
structure could not be used in a print medium, where something necessa-
rily comes first, 83 but it could be used on the Internet. Upon accessing
the document, the reader would be confronted with a page that had
words or icons for each segment, arranged in a circle, or perhaps, some
other non-linear fashion. Each segment, once accessed, would contain
links to some or all of the other segments, which the reader could click on
based on her own inclinations or sense of relevance. It is an interesting
question whether this alternative mode of presentation would not only
change the overall structure of the article (obviously it would) but also
the mode of argument within each segment.
Clearly, the Internet and World Wide Web are truly networks, in the
sense defined above.84 Any application of XML is likely to display the
same network properties. To begin with, all the users of the language
would be connected with each other; the whole point is to facilitate com-
munication between any two users of the language without the need to
route the communications through a central control mechanism. Second,
the entire protocol is available to its users in an equal fashion, thereby
reproducing the general structure at each particular site. This is true of
HTML as well as XML of course; what distinguishes XML is that the set
of protocols available to each user is more specific to the user's function,
and thus more powerful. Third, and again consistent with the general
features of a network, XML is an entirely functional relationship; a user
participates in the network simply by downloading the protocol and using
it, without needing to establish any particular relationship with any other
participant in the network. This means, in accordance with the final fea-
ture of a network, that the system is an intrinsically open one. Anyone
can join by simply using the language and communicating with some
83. Several fiction writers have attempted to escape from the linearity of written nar-
rative in printed books. The most explicit effort is JULIO CORTAZAR, HOPSCOTCH (Greg-
ory Rabassa trans., 1998). To some extent, this is also true of novels such as JOSEPH
CONRAD, NOSTROMO (1917); VLADIMIR NABOKOV, PALE FIRE (1963); MILORD PAVIC,
DICTIONARY OF THE KHAZARS (Christina Pribicevic-Zoric, trans.).
84. For another discussion of the Internet as a network, see Lemley & McGowan,
supra note 68.
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other participant in the network. In theory, it would be possible to re-
strict access to the network through business means, such as encryption,
or legal means, such as intellectual property protection. Incentives for
doing so will typically be weak, however, and will often motivate users in
the opposite direction. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, lan-
guages generally display positive network externalities-when additional
people begin using the language, the language becomes more valuable to
the existing users. This general property of language will clearly apply to
languages developed within the XML protocol as well.
B. XML As A POLITICAL STRUCTURE
The network features of XML also apply to ordinary language, of
course. Any language connects each of its speakers with any other, re-
produces its general structure within each individual user, defines its par-
ticipants in the functional terms of language use, and is open to anyone
who learns the language. As stated at the outset, XML also resembles
ordinary language in that it possesses strong political implications.
Choices about which of the languages spoken within a nation will be used
for official purposes, taught in school, or permitted in judicial proceed-
ings determine the political influence and social status of the speakers.
85
A natural way to express this is to say that language is an instrument of
political power. Neil Netanel has insightfully explored the ways in which
the Internet, despite its benign appearance and reputation, can create so-
cial injustice through status discrimination, content discrimination (in-
cluding filtering and self-censorship), and limitations on access. 86 The
following discussion, which is more limited, focuses specifically on XML,
and on the relationship between language and our contemporary concept
of power.
Hobbes treats power as a possession, a set of abilities that enable a
person to get what he wants,87 Bertrand Russell uses a similar defini-
tion.88 Most modern writers, however, tend to regard it as a relationship,
the ability of one person to control the actions of another. 89 In recent
years, a body of thought has developed that treats power as an aspect of
social structure, rather than personal ability or behavior. According to
Steven Lukes, for example, there are several forms of power; one corre-
sponds to the familiar notion that A controls the actions of B, a second
85. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MI-
NORITY RIGHTS 107-30 (1995). See generally BRIAN WEINSTEIN, THE CIVIL TONGUE: PO-
LITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF LANGUAGE CHOICES (1983).
86. See Neil Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000).
87. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 10 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991).
88. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS 25 (1992).
89. See, e.g., Robert Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCi. 201 (1957), in
RODERICK BELL ET AL., POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 79
(1969); MICHAEL MANN, 1 THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER 6 (1986); MAX WEBER, ECON-




involves agenda control, the ability to set the agenda for political decision
making, and the third involves the ability to create an overall structure
that favors some individual or groups over others.90 Foucault emphasizes
this final category when he speaks of a grid that underlies all social action
and controls its various expressions91 as does Giddens when he describes
power as a necessary component of any human action, whose magnitude
varies with the actor's control of particular resources.92 Whether these
diffuse phenomena are truly recognizable as power, in the conventional
sense, is an open question, but they clearly represent a central feature in
certain modern theories about social ordering.
Language is closely related to this third conception of power, as Fou-
cault himself observes. 93 Modern theories of language emphasize that it
is much more than a neutral mode of expression; rather it is the medium
of thought itself, and forms the horizon which defines thought's possibili-
ties within a given culture.94 Language determines what is thought, the
way it is thought, and the extent of thought. Thus, the language exercises
power, in Lukes', Foucalt's and Giddens' sense, over those who speak it;
it creates an underlying structure that controls thought and behavior.
Most commonly, this exercise of power involves the use of language, not
its design. A language such as English was not created by any living per-
son, or indeed, within living memory, so its control over its speakers'
thoughts and action lies beyond the reach of any current political actor.
It is the use of English that is political-the extent to which non-English
speaking groups within the United States are required to speak English,
for example, or the extent to which colloquial language is accepted in
schools or other governmental settings.
When a new language is created, however, its creators are able to exer-
cise political effects of a more comprehensive nature by the design deci-
sions that they make. One of the most vivid depictions of this
90. See LUKES, supra note 67.
91. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 202
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) ("Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a
certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose
internal mechanisms produce relations in which individuals are caught up."); MICHEL Fou-
CAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION 81-102, 92 (Robert
Hurley trans., 1978) (stating power is "a grid of intelligibility of the social order .... The
omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under
its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point,
or rather in every relation from one point to another."). See generally HUBERT DREYFUS
& PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS
184-204 (1982).
92. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, PROFILES AND CRITIQUES IN SOCIAL THEORY
197-230 (1982); see also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE (1985).
93. See FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 91, at 83 ("Power's hold
on sex is maintained through language, or rather through the act of discourse that creates,
from the very fact that it is articulated, a rule of law").
94. This idea was originally advanced by Sapir and Whorf. See generally EDWARD
SAPIR, LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SPEECH (1939); LANGUAGE,
THOUGHT AND REALITY, SELECTED WRITING OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF (John Carroll
ed., 1964). It has become a central principle of modern hermeneutics. See HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975).
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phenomenon-which after all does not occur very often in the real
world-can be found in Orwell's 1984.9 5 The novel describes any number
of grinding oppressions, including continuous surveillance of the popu-
lace, the total suppression of political liberty, complete control of infor-
mation by the state, a massive secret police apparatus, and the use of
torture to brainwash political dissidents. But the oppression most de-
structive of freedom, in Orwell's view, and the one he chose to expand on
in an essay appended to the novel, is the creation of Newspeak, a lan-
guage designed by the rulers of the totalitarian state to perpetuate their
regime of Ingsoc (English Socialism). Here is part of his description:
The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of ex-
pression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees
of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was
intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all
and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought-that is, a thought di-
verging from the principles of Ingsoc, should be literally unthinkable,
at least so far as thought is dependent upon words. Its vocabulary
was so constructed as to give exact and often very subtle expression
to every meaning that a party member could properly wish to ex-
press, while excluding all other meanings and also the possibility of
arriving at them by indirect methods. 96
IV. GOVERNING XML
A. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
With the network and the political aspects of XML in mind, we can
now assess the W3C and negotiated rulemaking models as means of gov-
erning the process by which XML is used. The issue is not the creation of
XML itself; that is currently being carried out by the W3C, under the
decisions procedures described above. Rather, the issue is the rules that
will be imposed on groups that use the XML protocols to create special-
ized languages. Consider two examples, both of which display the capa-
bilities of XML; first, a language used by hospitals that enables them to
transfer patient records (subject to patient consent, as the law currently
provides); second, a language used by employers in a particular industry
to obtain personnel information for hiring purposes, and to disseminate
information about job opportunities. Unlike HTML, XML will enable
the hospitals to transfer patient records directly, to search through all the
records of the participating hospitals to find patterns of disease, or of
positive or adverse response to treatment, and to rapidly identify availa-
ble resources such as a specialist who is on duty at a particular time, an
available bed, operating room or machine, or a supply of a particular
medicine. Similarly, it will enable employers to search through job appli-
cations for particular characteristics of the worker, enable the applicants
to conduct a similar search of job announcements, and it will facilitate the
95. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1950).
96. Id. at 246.
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development of programs that automatically match firm and worker
characteristics.
Both these languages should be designed to capture the network char-
acter of an XML language. Any hospital should be able to communicate
with any other hospital, and any employer should be able to communi-
cate with any other employer on an equal basis. Individual patients and
job applicants should be able to communicate with any hospital or em-
ployer. Each portion of the network should be able to perform all its
operations, so that the departure of any particular participant, or group of
participants, does not impair the ability of the remaining participants.
The networks should be organized in functional terms, and without mem-
bership requirements, so that anyone who needs the information (again
subject to privacy limitations) can join the network and obtain it.
It seems unlikely that any external regulation or control would be re-
quired to achieve this desirable purpose. As described above, the net-
work structure is virtually inherent in any XML language; the whole
value of these languages lies in their decentralized, open structure. Of
course, some group of hospitals or employers might want to create a
more restricted system of communication on the World Wide Web, and
there is no reason to prohibit them from doing so. But the application
that will make a difference, the one that will take hold and become
widely used, will be a decentralized, open language that will enable large
numbers of organizations and related users to share information and
communicate with one another in a more efficient manner. Such a lan-
guage may be regarded as a market phenomenon; in fact, it will respond
to a demand for communication that is even broader, since it will be felt
as insistently by non-profit organizations. 97
Although the XML applications that will be most important will have
this network quality, they will also possess many of the political charac-
teristics of a language. The reason is that they must be designed, and the
designer is likely to be a much smaller and potentially more restricted
body than the ultimate group of users. Lawrence Lessig has pointed out
that the design features of Internet communications, which he refers to as
Code, allow the government to regulate the Internet,98 and Neil Netanel
has explored the political morality of doing so.99 The point here is that
these design features are inherently a mode of regulation, although they
may be private rather than public. Once they are built into the particular
language, they will affect everyone who relies upon that language, often
in rather powerful ways. The subsequent openness and decentralization
of the network will not counteract the determinism of its design, since the
97. See, e.g., 1. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PIrr.
L. REV. 993 (1994); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Gov-
ernment: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413
(1997).
98. See LESSIG, supra note 17.
99. See Netanel, supra note 86.
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network is defined in functional terms, and users who want to join subse-
quently can only do so if they adopt the previously designed language.
Suppose, for example, that the XML language for hospitals is designed
by a group of programmers who are employed by large hospitals. It is
likely that the resulting design for patient records would contain tags that
identified the drugs that each patient was given, at what stages in the
patient's illness and in what amounts. Such a design would be enor-
mously valuable. A physician who was trying to decide whether an inno-
vative drug would benefit her patient could readily find out, without ever
learning the name of any patient or otherwise violating anyone's privacy,
precisely how many times the drug had been given for the particular ail-
ment in question, at what stage and in what amount, and what the results
were. But would the design, as developed by these hospital employees,
also contain tags indicating how many times each hospital had been ac-
cused of malpractice, how many times malpractice had been found, which
physicians had committed it, which procedures led to the highest number
of accidental or unexplained deaths and so forth? Would the XML lan-
guage for employers contain tags that enabled people to determine how
often particular employers discriminated on the basis of race or age, or
that enabled women or gay people to determine which employers created
a hostile environment for members of their group, or members of their
group with the particular characteristics they possess?
B. THE CONTOURS OF AN EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SCHEME
These political implications of XML languages raise the issue of design
procedure: how will decisions be made regarding the design of particular
languages within the XML framework? To begin with, it would appear
that the procedure should be pluralist in nature, that is, it should accept
the participants' choice of a decision, rather than relying on some expert,
authority or substantive set of rules. Each language should be designed
to meet the needs of those who will use it, and the best way to do so is to
consult the potential users. There are no sets of rules available in this
area, nor are there any recognized experts who know the best rules in
advance. The reasons, among others, are that the entire enterprise is too
new for anyone to have had significant experience, and that the needs of
the users are too varied and complex to be known to one person or em-
bodied in a pre-established set of rules.
As previously noted, the least demanding pluralist procedure is a ma-
jority vote, but the decentralized, open character of a network counsels
against this option. If a significant proportion of potential users are dis-
satisfied with the result, they are unlikely to use the language, and it will
fail to achieve the positive network externalities that constitute much of
its value. Absent compulsion, therefore, the decision procedure that will
achieve the desired outcome is at least supermajority and more probably
consensus. This may mean unanimity, as in negotiated rulemaking, but
the preferable definition, following the W3C procedures, is that only a
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small number of the participants can disagree (five percent, for example)
and that even those participants must agree that they "can live with" the
decision. While this is a demanding decision rule, the success of the W3C
attests to its practicality.
A second question about the design procedure involves the identity of
the participants. As in the case of the World Wide Web, there is an obvi-
ous distinction between those who design the language and those who use
it. The users are an open-ended group, of large or vast proportions, who
join the network by simply accepting its functional rules. The designers
are a much smaller group who can work together to achieve consensus
about those rules. In the W3C, the designers, called Working Groups, are
drawn from the Advisory Committee. This may seem like a promising
model; the Advisory Committee, after all, is open to any organization,
and joining requires only a relatively small fee that virtually any organiza-
tion can afford. As a practical matter, however, the Advisory Commit-
tee's membership is quite restricted in nature and dominated by one type
of organization, namely, businesses who provide Internet services. Users,
even large corporate or government users, constitute less than twenty
percent of the total. If one excludes large research laboratories, which, as
a group, are closely connected with the Internet's creation, the figure
drops to a bit more than ten percent. Smaller users are almost com-
pletely absent. The problem for non-specialists is probably not the fee
but a lack of motivation. The World Wide Web, despite its importance,
represents just one of many issues that a firm must confront; many firms
will not even be aware of the Web's governance structure. Once aware,
and once convinced of the important role that this governance process
plays, the organization must identify one or more individuals who will
participate in the process. These persons, moreover, must be knowledge-
able about the subject matter; uninformed people tend to be ignored in
collective decision making sessions.
Skewed representation in the decision making body will lead to a gen-
eral design that favors some uses, and some users, while disfavoring
others. These preferences will be built into the structure of the language,
just as the preference for political conformity was built into Newspeak.
In the examples given above, an XML language designed by large hospi-
tals is likely to facilitate access to information about the performance of
particular drugs, but to deny access to information about the performance
of particular doctors; it is likely to assist those who want to continue the
status quo, but not those who want to alter it. An XML language de-
signed by employers is likely to lower the transaction costs of the hiring
process for both employers and applicants, but to deny information about
the less savory aspects of the process to potential employees, potential
litigants, and law enforcement officials.
The value of more comprehensive representation of different groups in
a decision making process is both political and conceptual. In a pluralist
process, and in our pluralist society, the representational advantage is ob-
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vious; different groups have different interests in the process, and their
inclusion in the process means that these interests must be taken into
account. While this is advantageous, it interacts with the decision proce-
dure in complex ways. The more divergent groups are included, the
greater the difficulty in reaching decisions using a consensus or even
supermajority rule, and the greater the pressure for moving to a simple
majority. But majority voting conflicts with the decentralized, open, non-
coercive quality of a network; an XML language, like any other language,
will be generally accepted if it is simply taken for granted, and resisted-
by certain groups at least-if it is a source of controversy. In addition,
majority voting formalizes the choice of participants, since it makes the
precise proportions of representatives from each group a decisive factor.
With a consensus or supermajority rule, the precise numbers are less im-
portant as long as there is someone to speak for each interest group. Fi-
nally, groups that lose out in a majority vote will tend to seek redress in
other fora. When the vote is taken by the supreme political authority, the
only sources of redress are foreign powers or violence, both of which are
rather costly avenues to pursue, but when the vote is taken by a private
body like an XML design group, the political system provides a potential
source of redress, and that is a much more readily pursued alternative.
To some extent, these problems are meliorated by the second advan-
tage of representation, which is conceptual. When different views are
represented in the decision making group, the more likely the group will
be to reach non-zero sum solutions that take all interests into account. 100
Of course, there will not always be such a solution; in some situations, our
definition of fairness is nothing more than the best way to cut a cake. 101
But when different points of view are represented by the participants in a
decision making process, and when those participants are motivated, by
either internal or external means, to act cooperatively, new solutions
sometimes emerge that simply had not been previously conceived. This
may seem naive to many people who have read too much public choice
literature, but there is a considerable amount of empirical evidence in its
favor, and to deny it is to claim that all creative human problem-solving
occurs in settings that are free of conflicting interests, which is a much
more naive position.
Ensuring the broad participation that will secure these political and
conceptual advantages may be a difficult task. To begin with, there is a
natural reluctance among like-minded individuals to include others who
think differently and have different values. How willing will administra-
100. See generally Edward Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist:
Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 743
(1993).
101. See generally JACK ROBERTSON & WILLIAM WEBB, CAKE CUTTING ALGORITHMS:
BE FAIR IF You CAN (1998). These algorithms are designed to divide a fixed and positive
entity (a cake, an ongoing business) or a fixed and negative entity (a lawn to be mowed, an
expensive obligation) so that each participant feels that the division has been fair. They all




tors of large hospitals be to include patient advocates, medical malprac-
tice attorneys, and government regulators in a working group that they
have organized? How willing will employers be to include union repre-
sentatives, women's rights, minority and gay rights advocates, plaintiff's
lawyers and government regulators? We need not imagine either group
filled with evil or conspiratorial people to conclude that such participants
will be excluded. All that is needed is the more restrained hypothesis
that people hold their beliefs sincerely, and regard those who disagree
with them as mistaken and potentially disruptive. Moreover, a mere invi-
tation to such groups will not be sufficient. Because the issue will not be
as salient to these groups, and because they will generally not have staff
members who are knowledgeable about the issue and available to spend
large amounts of time on it, they must receive positive encouragement of
some kind. This means a specific invitation, at the very least, and perhaps
financial assistance of some sort.
At this point, the example of negotiated rulemaking becomes relevant.
As provided by statute, the group that designs a proposed rule under this
procedure is constituted by a public authority (the agency) or by an
outside convener who is in turn appointed by that authority. The
agency's announcement of the negotiated rulemaking must include "a list
of the interests which are likely to be significantly affected by the rule"
and "a list of the persons proposed to represent such interests."' 0 2 Thus,
the procedure involves a definitive effort by a public authority, to ensure
that all relevant interests are represented. In addition, the statute goes
on to provide that those "who will be significantly affected by a proposed
rule and who believe that their interests will not be adequately repre-
sented by any person specified in the notice ... may apply for, or nomi-
nate another person for membership." 10 3 While negotiated rulemaking
has been regarded as the quintessential expression of pluralism,10 4 the
emphasis on having all affected interests represented, combined with the
lack of concern about specific proportions of representatives and the re-
quirement of consensus decision making, suggests that the conceptual ef-
fort predominates. That is, the aspiration is that the members of the
group will work cooperatively to develop new solutions that will be pref-
erable to the one the agency would have developed on its own. But while
the agency defers to the group that it has created on substantive issues, it
does not defer to any private organization on the construction of the
group. On this matter, the agency exercises intensive supervision, be-
cause only such supervision can ensure that the group is sufficiently bal-
anced to generate desirable solutions.
Following the example of negotiated rulemaking, some supervening au-
thority is needed to ensure that groups that are organized to develop
XML languages contain representatives of all the interests that will be
102. 5 U.S.C. § 56 4(a)(3)-( 4) (1994).
103. Id. § 564(b).
104. See Coglianese, supra note 45; Rossi, supra note 45.
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affected by that language. Of course, some XML groups may achieve the
desirable breadth of participation on their own. If experience is any
guide, however, most groups will not.105 Supervision will be needed to
determine which groups have failed to include relevant participants, and
then induce them to institute the necessary changes. One conceivable
source of such supervision is the W3C, which, after all, has established the
protocols for XML in the first place, and currently supervises the entire
World Wide Web. But W3C, at least in its present form, lacks the admin-
istrative capacity to monitor all XML developers, the institutional moti-
vation to do so, and the political authority to enforce any decisions that it
reached. This is not surprising, given the composition of its Advisory
Committee. The situation not only makes W3C an unlikely regulator, but
also indicates the need for regulation. Left to their own devices, most of
the groups that are organized to develop XML languages will probably
look like W3C itself-they will be dominated by suppliers of the goods or
services in question, include a few other organizations which specialize in
the field, and perhaps of few large customers or users.
Unless W3C decides to accompany its promulgation of XML protocols
with a massive redefinition of its role and reorganization of its structure,
the government must be the supervening authority that is needed to en-
sure the necessary levels of participation. What this means is that gov-
ernment would forbid any legal or natural person within its jurisdiction to
use an XML language unless that language had been developed by a pro-
cess that met specified criteria of participation. In the United States, this
requirement would presumably be imposed by national legislation under
the commerce power, and enforced by a federal agency such as the Fed-
eral Trade Commission 10 6 or the Federal Communications Commission.
105. For example, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws are organized as law reform organizations, and explic-
itly claim neutrality and balance. The working groups that they have formed to draft
proposed uniform laws, however, have typically lacked representation from the full range
of interested parties. In drafting the payments provisions, Articles 3 and 4, the ALI and
NCCUSL have not only failed to include consumer representatives, but have not even
included corporate users. See Rubin, supra note 100, at 759-67. As a result, the statutes
that they have produced are widely regarded as shamelessly pro-bank. See, e.g., Frederick
Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE
L. 334 (1952); Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or Who
Is Saving the UCC, 26 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 563 (1993); Kathleen Pachtel, Interest Group
Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Pro-
posed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991); Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995). The
statute is generally defended only by those who were responsible for designing or imple-
menting the drafting process. See, e.g., Fred Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in
Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405 (1991).
106. It would not be difficult for a federal statute to declare that the use of a computer
language in interstate commerce that was not designed through a sufficiently cooperative
process is an unfair trade practice under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) ("Unfair methods of competi-
tion in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting




The rules for participation in negotiated rulemaking would be a useful
starting point, because there has already been some experience with
them. Truly balanced participation, however, would probably require
that the participating for-profit organizations subsidize the selected non-
profit participants in some manner, perhaps by charging them the sort of
fees that the W3C imposes.
Of course, federal regulation has a bad reputation these days, and it
may seem particularly inappropriate for the Internet, with its decentral-
ized structure and its bedazzling rate of growth and change. There are, in
fact, those who celebrate the Internet's unregulated anarchy, often in
fairly millennial terms.10 7 But one must remember that the subject mat-
ter of the regulation in question, namely XML languages, is inherently
political, as most languages are. Most users of these languages will be
subject to decisions that were reached by distant people whom they do
not know, regardless of whether those people are private actors or gov-
ernment officials. 10 8 Moreover, the Internet, far from being some ideal-
ized playground of private enterprise is, in fact, a government creation. It
was invented by that most governmental of governmental institutions, the
Department of Defense, and remained a military project for the first
twenty years of its development.' 0 9 It was then transferred to the Na-
tional Science Foundation, which operated it for another decade. Indeed,
the Internet was so inherently governmental in its first decades that fed-
eral legislation was required to allow its use for private commercial trans-
actions. 110 Both the World Wide Web itself and the Netscape browser
were developed by employees of government-funded research facilities-
CERN and the University of Illinois. It can hardly be argued that moder-
ate levels of government intervention will kill the Internet when massive
levels of government intervention were responsible for its creation.
What is crucial, of course, is that the government regulate XML in a
manner that preserves its advantageous network features, while moderat-
ing its political impact. Heavy-handed regulation is also an abuse;
whether it is a worse abuse than private oppression can be fairly de-
scribed as one of the most controversial questions in the history of the
world. At present, the government's position has been ambivalent. On
the one hand, it enacted overbroad decency legislation that was struck
down by the Supreme Court;1 1' on the other hand, it has declared a
three-year moratorium on taxation of Internet sales' 1 2 and announced an
107. See supra note 97 (citing sources).
108. Habermas regards this as a central dilemma of modern society-that people's
every day experience, their "lifeworld," is colonized by political forces that are not only
beyond their control but beyond their comprehension. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THE-
ORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: VOL. 2: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF
FUNCTIONALIST REASON 301-73 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987).
109. See Bickerstaff, supra note 8.
110. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
111. See genearlly Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 897 (1997) (declaring unconstitutional the
Communications Decency Act of 1996).
112. See Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-2719 (1998).
[Vol. 531474
2000] GOVERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF XML
intention to surrender regulation of domain names to a private entity.113
Perhaps the problem is that the choices are conceived as either classic
command and control regulation, or a complete absence of regulation.
The preferable option in this case is a new mode of regulation that has
been explored by Jody Freeman, Clauss Offe, Guenther Teubner 14 and
others. In this case, it involves the effort to control a process rather than
a product, to establish an institutional dynamic that will be produce re-
sults that the government cannot prescribe or predict in advance, but that
are likely to satisfy the demands of fairness by virtue of the process used
in their creation.
CONCLUSION
This article joins a growing body of literature, by Lawrence Lessig, Neil
Netanel, Margaret Radin, R. Polk Wagner and others,11 5 which rejects
the view that the Internet either cannot or should not be regulated by
public authorities. In the case of XML, however, standard forms of regu-
lation will not work. While XML languages represent an exercise of
power that justifies regulation, their advantages lie in their network char-
acteristics that would be destroyed by the rigidity of the regulatory pro-
cess, and demand levels of information that would overwhelm any public
agency. Thus, the necessary and desirable regulation of XML is not one
that involves the imposition of rules, but the supervision and subtle ad-
justment of a private rule-making process. Thus, it challenges public pol-
icy makers to think in new ways. At the same time, like any other
important technological and social development, it also promises to teach
new ways of thought to those same policy makers.
113. See National Telecommunications and Information Admin., U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Statement of Policy on Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 31,741 (1998).
114. See generally Freeman, supra note 45; CLAUS OFFE, CONTRADICFnONS OF THE
WELFARE STATE (John Keane, ed. 1984); Guenther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Re-
thinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992); Guenther Teubner, The
"State" of Private Networks: The Emerging Legal Regime of Polycorporatism in Germany,
1993 BYU L. REV. 553 (1993). Teubner describes the state itself as a network; more specif-
ically, he says that "the state is now being transformed into the self-description of a loose
network of private and public actors." Id. at 570. This suggests that a mode of regulation
that is based on this conception of the state is in some sense homologous with the subject
matter being regulated in the case of XML languages, and therefore a more appropriate
mode of regulation.
115. See LESSIG, supra note 17; Netanel, supra note 86; Margaret Radin & R. Polk
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73
CH.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998).
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